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595 
ADDRESSING THE COSTS AND COMITY CONCERNS 
OF INTERNATIONAL E-DISCOVERY 
John T. Yip 
Abstract: The volume of electronically stored information (ESI) is expanding rapidly. 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, litigants may request electronic discovery (e-
discovery) of many different forms of ESI. In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
party responding to an e-discovery request presumptively pays all e-discovery costs, 
including the costs of preserving, producing, and reviewing the requested ESI. Therefore, the 
rapidly increasing volume of ESI has substantially increased the costs of e-discovery for 
producing parties. In the 2003 case, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York established a two-step test that allows a court to shift 
some of the e-discovery costs from the responding party to the requesting party. Since 2003, 
many federal district courts and some state courts have followed the two-step Zubulake test 
for conducting e-discovery in the United States. However, no court has yet established a test 
for cost-shifting in international e-discovery—conducting e-discovery on ESI located outside 
the United States. International e-discovery has unique costs and implicates concerns of 
national sovereignty. This Comment argues that courts should adopt a cost-shifting test for 
international e-discovery that starts with a comity analysis and then applies Zubulake’s two-
step cost-shifting test. Furthermore, courts applying this test should enforce cost-shifting 
orders through an escrow system whereby the requesting party will deposit some of the 
shifted costs with the court for later disbursement to the producing party. 
INTRODUCTION 
The amount of electronically stored information (ESI) worldwide is 
increasing at a rapid rate.1 In 2005, the total amount of ESI worldwide 
(the “digital universe”) was 130 exabytes.2 In 2011, the digital universe 
expanded to over 1800 exabytes, enough data to fill 57.5 billion 32GB 
Apple iPads.3 Consistent with this rapid growth in ESI, Law Technology 
News reported that the total cost of e-discovery rose from $2 billion in 
                                                     
1. See Rich Miller, ‘Digital Universe’ to Add 1.8 Zettabytes in 2011, DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE 
(June 28, 2011), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2011/06/28/digital-universe-to-add-
1-8-zettabytes-in-2011.  
2. Id. One exabyte is equal to one billion gigabytes. Exabyte (EB) Definition, SEARCHSTORAGE 
(Nov. 1998), http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/definition/exabyte.  
3. Miller, supra note 1; see also State of the Universe: An Executive Summary, IDC (June 2011), 
http://www.emc.com/collateral/demos/microsites/emc-digital-universe-2011/index.htm (explaining 
the significance of IDC’s findings). The IDC website states the data in terms of zettabytes. Id. One 
zettabyte is equal to a thousand exabytes. Zettabyte Definition, SEARCHSTORAGE (May 2004), 
http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/definition/zettabyte. This Comment uses exabytes for 
consistency. 
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2006 to $2.8 billion in 2009 and estimated that the total cost would rise 
ten to fifteen percent annually in 2010 and 2011.4 
Electronic discovery (e-discovery) begins when one of the parties in a 
lawsuit requests that the other party produce certain ESI that is relevant 
to the requesting party’s claims or defenses.5 Many forms of ESI are 
discoverable in federal district courts.6 As a general rule, the producing 
party pays the costs of preserving, finding, and sending the ESI to the 
requesting party.7 Due to the high volume of available ESI, discovery 
requests can pose a burden for producing parties.8 In one case, the cost 
of complying with an e-discovery request was $249,000.9 In another 
case, the cost to restore, search, and produce data in archived electronic 
backup tapes was around $274,000.10 Twenty-five percent of large-cap 
businesses11 in the United States and the United Kingdom anticipate an 
increase in their e-discovery budgets for 2011,12 notwithstanding 
improvements in e-discovery tools and technologies.13 
                                                     
4. George Socha & Tom Gelbmann, Climbing Back: Revenue Climbing Back for EDD Industry, 
LAW TECH. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202463900292. 
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note (2006) (“Using current technology, for example, 
a party might be called upon to produce word processing documents, e-mail messages, electronic 
spreadsheets, different image or sound files, and material from databases.”). 
7. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978). 
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
9. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 570 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
10. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The 
exact amount, $273,649.39, “includes $165,954.67 to restore and search the tapes and $107,694.72 
in attorney and paralegal review costs.” Id. The cost of complying with e-discovery requests 
remains high in recent cases. See, e.g., Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., No. 11-
2316, 2012 WL 887593, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 16, 2012) ($365,000); Moore v. Publicis Groupe, No. 
11 Civ. 1279(ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 607412, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012) ($550,000); Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Wilkins, No. 1:10-cv-00674 LJO JLT, 2012 WL 570048, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 
2012) ($2,000,000 to search and host over 400 backup tapes). 
11. Fulbright’s Litigation Trends Survey: A Little Less Litigation; More Regulation, FULBRIGHT 
& JAWORSKI L.L.P. (Oct. 18, 2011), 
http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.detail&article_id=9902&site_id=286 
(defining a “large-cap” business as a business with “$1 billion or more in gross revenues”). 
12. Id. 
13. See Jason Krause, When Is an E-Discovery Burden an Undue Burden?, LAW TECH. NEWS 
(June 1, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202458961735 (“‘I find that 
technology has made the cost of e-discovery perhaps 30 percent cheaper, but we are forced to 
handle 70 percent more volume than in the past,’ says David Kessler, partner with Drinker Biddle in 
Philadelphia. ‘Once we started to get a handle on e-mail and other file types, audio files, social 
media, and other discoverable types of data began coming into play.’”).  
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Federal district courts address the high costs of e-discovery in the 
United States by shifting some e-discovery costs to the requesting party 
under the two-step test articulated in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.14 
The first step of the Zubulake test is to examine the ESI’s 
“accessibility.”15 Although the original Zubulake case described 
accessibility in terms of the data storage format,16 some post-Zubulake 
cases have framed accessibility in terms of the overall cost to the 
producing party.17 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) state 
that ESI is inaccessible if it creates an “undue burden or cost” for the 
producing party.18 If the court finds the ESI accessible, then the 
producing party must bear the costs of e-discovery.19 However, if the 
court finds the data inaccessible, it will continue on to the second part of 
the Zubulake test, which requires considering and balancing seven 
factors related to the cost and significance of the e-discovery request.20 
One of three results will occur: the court might allow e-discovery at the 
producing party’s expense;21 the court might not allow e-discovery;22 or, 
the court might allow e-discovery with some restrictions, such as 
requiring that the requesting party pay some or all of the e-discovery 
costs.23 
Few federal courts have addressed the costs of conducting e-
discovery on ESI outside the United States (international e-discovery), 
even though international e-discovery involves additional costs.24 When 
                                                     
14. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also 
Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 284 (describing the two steps of the Zubulake test). 
15. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318. 
16. Id. 
17. See, e.g., OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 476–77 (N.D. Cal. 2003) 
(“Accessibility turns largely on the expense of production.”); W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, 
LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38, 43 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding data “not reasonably accessible” because retrieval 
of the data would involve “undue burden or cost”). 
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
19. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324. 
20. Id.; see also infra Part II.A. 
21. See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 
467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
22. See, e.g., Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-1445 (NPM/DEP), 2011 WL 
2154279, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011). 
23. See, e.g., Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
24. A few courts have addressed the costs of international e-discovery. See, e.g., U & I Corp. v. 
Advanced Med. Design, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 667, 677 (M.D. Fla. 2008); In re Auto. Refinishing Paint 
Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482, 496 (E.D. Pa. 2005). For information on the additional costs of 
international e-discovery, see DATICON ELEC. EVIDENCE DISCOVERY, INC., REDUCING THE RISK 
AND COST OF INTERNATIONAL AND MULTI-LINGUAL EDISCOVERY CASES (2009). 
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addressing international ESI, American courts rarely limit discovery on 
grounds of cost,25 rarely use cost-shifting,26 and often compel producing 
parties to hand over ESI even though doing so would violate foreign 
blocking statutes.27 Courts that have considered the use of cost-shifting 
to date did not provide general criteria for determining when cost-
shifting is appropriate.28 Consequently, courts have not settled on the 
proper analysis for determining the appropriateness of cost-shifting in 
international e-discovery. 
The FRCP govern discovery in federal district courts generally, 
regardless of whether the discovery request involves ESI in the United 
States or in a foreign country.29 However, international e-discovery 
sometimes implicates foreign laws and international treaties, such as the 
Hague Convention.30 Although the 2006 amendments to the FRCP 
specifically addressed e-discovery, they did not address issues unique to 
international e-discovery.31 
This Comment addresses the lack of clarity regarding international e-
discovery standards by proposing a test for analyzing comity concerns 
                                                     
25. See, e.g., AccessData Corp. v. ALSTE Techs. GmbH, No. 2:08cv569, 2010 WL 318477, at *2 
(D. Utah Jan. 21, 2010) (“[T]he costs of transmitting information and electronic documents ought to 
be relatively minimal.”). 
26. There are a few cases that allowed cost-shifting. See, e.g., U & I Corp., 251 F.R.D. at 677; 
Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (involving an e-discovery request that 
includes some foreign ESI); In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 496. 
27. Blocking statutes “restrict cross-border discovery of information intended for disclosure in 
foreign jurisdictions . . . .” THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF CROSS-
BORDER DISCOVERY CONFLICTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO NAVIGATING THE COMPETING CURRENTS 
OF INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY AND E-DISCOVERY 18 (Aug. 2008), available at 
https://thesedonaconference.org/publication/Framework%20for%20Analysis%20of%20Cross-
Border%20Discovery%20Conflicts. For a sampling of cases where an American court ordered 
discovery despite a blocking statute, see Munoz v. China Expert Tech., Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
10531(AKH), 2011 WL 5346323 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011) (ordering e-discovery despite a Chinese 
blocking statute); Sofaer Global Hedge Fund v. Brightpoint, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-01191-TWP-DML, 
2010 WL 4701419 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 12, 2010) (ordering e-discovery despite a French blocking 
statute); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010) (ordering e-discovery despite a Malaysian blocking statute). 
28. U & I Corp., 251 F.R.D. at 677 (allowing cost-shifting based on unique facts of the case); 
Quinby, 245 F.R.D. at 111 (allowing cost-shifting under Zubulake without stating whether Zubulake 
is appropriate for foreign ESI); In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 496 
(allowing cost-shifting under FRCP 45 without articulating factors for determining whether cost-
shifting would be appropriate in the future). 
29. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings 
in the United States district courts . . . .”). 
30. See Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, art. 1, 
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555.  
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
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and cost-shifting in such cases. Part I describes the high costs of e-
discovery. Part II explains the Zubulake test in general. Part III describes 
international e-discovery and surveys the ways in which courts have 
addressed the costs of international e-discovery. Part IV proposes a cost-
shifting approach for international e-discovery, advocates the use of 
“total cost” accessibility instead of “format” accessibility, and discusses 
a way to enforce cost-shifting orders. Finally, Part V applies the test 
from Part IV to the facts of In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust 
Litigation32 as an example of how the test would operate in litigation.33 
I. THE HIGH VOLUME OF DISCOVERABLE ESI OFTEN 
MAKES E-DISCOVERY EXPENSIVE FOR THE PRODUCING 
PARTY 
E-discovery tends to be expensive due to the large volume of 
potentially discoverable ESI.34 FRCP 26(b)(1) states that a party may 
obtain via discovery “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 
party’s claim or defense . . . .”35 The FRCP allows for broad discovery,36 
and electronic data is generally no less discoverable than paper 
documents.37 Businesses store much of their data in electronic form.38 
Examples of discoverable ESI include “word processing documents, e-
mail messages, electronic spreadsheets, different image or sound files, 
and material from databases.”39 The high volume of discoverable ESI 
increases the three main e-discovery costs of preservation, production, 
and review. 
A.  Preserving ESI Can Disrupt Business and Impose Costs on the 
Producing Party 
Parties have a duty to preserve evidence that “[they know], or 
reasonably should know, will likely be requested in reasonably 
                                                     
32. 229 F.R.D. 482 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
33. Id. at 483–86. In this case, the requesting party wanted a non-party headquartered in Europe 
to produce various ESI at high expense. 
34. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
36. Gomez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he scope of 
discovery under the federal rules is broad . . . .”). 
37. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
38. See SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE 39–45 (Thomson/Reuters 2009). 
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
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foreseeable litigation.”40 In some instances, federal district courts may 
order a party to preserve potentially discoverable information.41 One 
district court noted in 2006 that preservation orders are becoming 
“increasingly routine.”42 Generally, a preservation order requires a party 
to retain ESI made by or prepared for persons who are likely to have 
relevant data.43 However, standards for adequate preservation vary 
widely.44 
If the producing party fails to comply with a preservation order or to 
meet the party’s duty of preservation, a court may impose monetary 
sanctions under FRCP 37.45 At trial, a court may also instruct the jury to 
infer that a party who destroyed ESI in violation of the preservation 
order did so because the ESI would have been unfavorable to that 
party.46 In at least one case, the court dismissed a party’s claims entirely 
for failure to preserve ESI.47 
To satisfy the duty of preservation and comply with preservation 
orders, a party might have to stop or limit using devices storing the data, 
such as company computers, for the course of litigation.48 This could 
disrupt the producing party’s business.49 Usually, the producing party 
must pay for all the costs of preserving data during the course of the 
lawsuit, including the costs of backing up the data.50 Because a 
preservation order might encompass numerous sources of ESI, such as 
                                                     
40. Scott v. IBM Corp., 196 F.R.D. 233, 249 (D.N.J. 2000). 
41. See SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 38, at 160–63. 
42. Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Pueblo of Laguna v. 
United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 133, 136 (2004)). 
43. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
44. Compare Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (requiring a party to issue written litigation hold notice to 
ensure that its employees and others are preserving relevant ESI), with Steuben Foods, Inc. v. 
Country Gourmet Foods, LLC, No. 08-CV-561S(F), 2011 WL 1549450, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 
2011) (not requiring a written litigation hold). 
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A); see also Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 348 F. 
Supp. 2d 332, 335 (D.N.J. 2004) (describing available sanctions against a party who failed to satisfy 
the duty of preservation). But see FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, a court 
may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored 
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information 
system.”). 
46. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 219–20. 
47. Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2006). 
48. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.442 (2004). 
49. Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
50. Id. at 373. 
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computers, computer networks, and backup storage devices,51 the costs 
of preserving the large volume of ESI may be “prohibitively 
expensive.”52 Moreover, the available sanctions for violating a 
preservation order could cause risk-averse producing parties to preserve 
more data than is necessary and spend money on servers and warehouses 
to hold the additional data.53 
B.  Producing Large Volumes of ESI Is Expensive 
Production of ESI includes restoring data on backup tapes,54 
searching the available ESI for responsive documents,55 and handling 
any glitches that might arise.56 The presumption is that the producing 
party must pay for the expenses of production.57 The high volume of 
available ESI can make production costs very expensive for the 
producing party.58 
Some e-discovery requests require the producing party to provide the 
requesting party with ESI dating back several years.59 Older data is often 
on backup tapes.60 In one case, plaintiffs requested that the defendants 
give them e-mails spanning a period of seven years from 2500 separate 
backup tapes.61 The defendants objected on grounds that it would cost 
them $1,500,000 to comply with the e-discovery request.62 The court 
found that the plaintiffs did not credibly rebut the defendants’ cost 
                                                     
51. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 48, § 11.442. 
52. Id. 
53. See E-Discovery: Avoid Over-Preservation and Reduce Risk of an “Unforced Error,” 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2011/October/24.pdf (interviewing Howard Sklar, Senior 
Counsel, Recommind Inc.). 
54. See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
55. See, e.g., id. 
56. See, e.g., PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-
657(DNH/RFT), 2007 WL 2687670, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (e-mails became separated 
from their attachments during e-discovery). 
57. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
58. See, e.g., Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091(JBS/JS), 2009 WL 3446761, at *1 
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009) (discussing an e-discovery request that would have cost the producing party 
$1,500,000). 
59. See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 313 (producing party had to produce e-mails from August 
1999 to December 2001).  
60. Id.; see also SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 38, at 52–53. 
61. Major Tours, Inc., 2009 WL 3446761, at *1. 
62. Id. 
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estimate and considered ways to alleviate the defendants’ burden.63 
Because an e-discovery request usually asks for ESI related to certain 
matters, the producing party must search through the available ESI to 
find the responsive information.64 Deloitte, a consulting and risk 
management company, found that many businesses are ill-prepared for 
handling e-discovery requests.65 For example, a producing party might 
lack the technology necessary to read certain older electronic 
documents66 and might have to hire an outside e-discovery vendor67 or 
purchase special software.68 A producing party might need months to 
complete production of the requested ESI.69 As in the preservation 
context, courts may sanction producing parties under FRCP 37 for 
failing to comply with an order to produce ESI.70 
Further complicating matters, some producing parties encounter 
glitches during production. On one occasion, a glitch separated e-mails 
from their attachments.71 The producing party had to incur additional 
costs to match attachments to their respective e-mails.72 On another 
occasion, a technical glitch truncated portions of some e-mails.73 The 
producing party thought that the e-mails were complete and turned them 
over to the requesting party.74 Upon further review, the producing party 
discovered that the e-mails were incomplete and had to produce full 
                                                     
63. Id. at *3. 
64. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 320 (“In order to search the tapes for responsive e-mails, UBS [the 
producing party] would have to engage in [a] costly and time-consuming process . . . .”). 
65. E-discovery: Mitigating Risk Through Better Communication, DELOITTE 2–7 (2010), 
available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/FAS_
ForensicCenter_us_fas-us_dfc/us_dfc/us_dfc_e_discovery_survey_final_061710.pdf. 
66. See, e.g., Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
67. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 44, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). There 
are many companies that specialize in assisting litigants with e-discovery. E-Discovery Is Big 
Business, WIRED (Jan. 29, 2006), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2006/01/70111. 
68. See, e.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 600 (E.D. 
Wis. 2004). 
69. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc., 261 F.R.D. at 48 (three months); Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR 
Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., No. 05-CVS-5564, 2006 WL 3093174, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (ten 
to eleven months to complete e-discovery).  
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). 
71. PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657(DNH/RFT), 2007 
WL 2687670, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007). 
72. Id. at *12. 
73. Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C-09-05535 EDL, 2011 WL 866993, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 11, 2011). 
74. Id.  
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versions of the e-mails.75 These examples illustrate how technical 
glitches can cost the producing party additional time and expense. 
C.  Reviewing the Information for Relevance and Privilege Causes the 
Producing Party to Incur Additional Costs 
After a producing party has located ESI that is potentially relevant to 
the e-discovery request, it must review the ESI for relevance and 
privilege.76 IT World, a technology news site, reported in 2008 that 
producing parties incur eighty percent of their e-discovery costs during 
review.77 Courts sometimes instruct producing parties to determine what 
ESI is relevant by performing keyword searches, which can be quite 
broad.78 As such, a keyword search could yield results that are privileged 
or not relevant to the case.79 In Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc.,80 an 
e-discovery request required the producing party to perform searches 
using eight keywords.81 The search terms yielded 8660 results, of which 
only 567 were actually responsive to the discovery request.82 In such 
cases, the producing party must review the ESI for relevance and 
privilege prior to turning it over to the requesting party, which can be a 
time-consuming and costly process, or risk disclosure of privileged 
information.83 The combined costs of preservation, production, and 
review can amount to over $100,000.84 
                                                     
75. Id. (“Defendant has agreed to produce some of the later portions of the ‘Re-auth’ email chain 
because they acknowledge that the discussions eventually shifted to business topics.”). 
76. Byers v. Ill. State Police, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 740, *10 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
77. Ursula Talley, Reduce Litigation Risk, Cut Costs with Proactive eDiscovery, IT WORLD 
(Aug. 13, 2008, 3:18 PM), http://www.itworld.com/tip/54250/reduce-litigation-risk-cut-costs-
proactive-ediscovery (“Eighty percent of eDiscovery cost, according to some analysts, is incurred 
during the legal review process.”). 
78. See, e.g., Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). In Quinby, the plaintiff 
made an e-discovery request and proposed as keywords, “words that are very commonly used in the 
investment banking industry, such as ‘asset,’ ‘deal,’ ‘insurance’ and ‘risk’ . . . . [and] even more 
commonly used words that could be present in practically any e-mail, including words such as ‘go,’ 
‘her,’ ‘okay’ and ‘she’ . . . .” Id. For a general overview of the strengths and weaknesses of keyword 
searches, see SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 38, at 229–32. 
79. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 571 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
80. 229 F.R.D. 568 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
81. Id. at 570. 
82. Id. at 571. 
83. See, e.g., Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). But see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) (allowing a party to notify the other party that certain 
produced information is privileged and should be returned, sequestered, or destroyed). 
84. See, e.g., Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., No. 2:07-cv-1294, 2011 WL 
1748620, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011). The two defendants each filed a Bill of Costs. Id. at *2. 
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II.  SOME COURTS ADDRESS THE HIGH COSTS OF E-
DISCOVERY BY SHIFTING SOME OF THOSE COSTS TO 
THE REQUESTING PARTY 
In some cases, producing parties have objected to e-discovery 
requests on grounds of undue burden and expense.85 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has only addressed the high costs of e-discovery once, in the 1978 
case of Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders.86 In that case, which 
involved securities fraud, the plaintiff requested that the defendant 
produce computer tapes that contained the names of people who bought 
a certain financial security.87 Although the Court described a general 
presumption that the producing party should bear the costs of e-
discovery,88 it noted that courts may use “cost-shifting” to order the 
requesting party to pay for some or all of the costs of performing e-
discovery in order to more equitably distribute costs.89 The Court stated 
that a court may use cost-shifting to protect the producing party from 
“undue burden or expense.”90 However, the Court did not articulate any 
criteria for determining whether the expenses in a particular case warrant 
cost-shifting.91 Although e-discovery is becoming increasingly important 
and the volume of ESI is rising rapidly, the Court has not addressed e-
discovery cost concerns since the Oppenheimer decision in 1978. 
After Oppenheimer, district courts were split on the proper analysis 
for cost-shifting.92 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
stated that it would be fairer to shift costs if a particular request was less 
likely to yield relevant results in McPeek v. Ashcroft.93 In contrast, the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York applied an 
eight-factor test for cost-shifting in Rowe Entertainment Inc. v. William 
                                                     
One defendant, Hoosier, claimed $143,007.05 in e-discovery costs. Id. at *3. The other defendant, 
DMS, claimed $246,101.41 in e-discovery costs. Id. 
85. See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
86. 437 U.S. 340 (1978). 
87. Id. at 344–45. 
88. Id. at 358. 
89. Id.  
90. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)).  
91. Id. at 358–59.  
92. Compare McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (using the marginal utility 
test, which stated, “[t]he more likely it is that the backup tape contains information that is relevant 
to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that the government agency search at its own expense”), with 
Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (using an 
eight-factor test to determine when cost-shifting is appropriate). 
93. 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001). 
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Morris Agency, Inc.94 
In 2003, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York refined the eight-factor Rowe test in 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.95 Zubulake was a gender discrimination 
case in which the plaintiff sought e-discovery of responsive e-mails on 
the backup drives of five people.96 The defendant objected on grounds 
that it would cost $300,000 to comply with the e-discovery request.97 
After considering the facts, Judge Scheindlin developed a two-step test 
for determining when cost-shifting is appropriate.98 First, the court asked 
whether the requested ESI was “accessible.”99 Upon finding that the 
requested ESI was inaccessible,100 the court applied seven weighted 
factors to decide whether to allow cost-shifting.101 
The Zubulake test has influenced federal district courts across the 
country.102 The resulting body of case law refined the Zubulake test by 
specifying when cost-shifting is available and what types of costs may 
be shifted.103 In 2006, Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court ratified the 
concept of e-discovery cost-shifting in an amendment to FRCP 26, 
which governs discovery.104 The amendment addresses the high costs of 
conducting e-discovery on large volumes of ESI and permits courts to 
use cost-shifting for e-discovery of inaccessible sources.105 Scholars 
                                                     
94. 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The eight factors are:  
(1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of discovering critical 
information; (3) the availability of such information from other sources; (4) the purposes for 
which the responding party maintains the requested data [sic] (5) the relative benefit to the 
parties of obtaining the information; (6) the total cost associated with production; (7) the 
relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; and (8) the resources 
available to each party. Each of these factors is relevant in determining whether discovery costs 
should be shifted in this case.  
Id. 
95. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
96. Id. at 312–13. 
97. Id. at 313. 
98. Id. at 318 (“Thus, cost-shifting should be considered only when electronic discovery imposes 
an ‘undue burden or expense’ on the responding party.” (emphasis in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26(c))). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 320. 
101. Id. at 322. 
102. In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 MD 1695(CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 983987, 
at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007) (“The major case of Zubulake [I] . . . set forth a widely followed 
standard for determining when cost shifting is appropriate.”). 
103. See infra Part II.B–C. 
104. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006) (discussing changes to the 
discovery rules). 
105. See id. 
17 -- Yip FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/4/2012 9:15 PM 
606 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:595 
 
have observed that the 2006 amendments to FRCP 26 embraced the 
Zubulake test.106 
A.  The Zubulake Test Has Two Steps: The Initial “Accessibility” 
Analysis and the Subsequent Seven-Factor Balancing Test for 
Inaccessible Data 
In order for a court to apply the Zubulake test, the producing party 
must first object to the e-discovery request on grounds of undue burden 
or cost under FRCP 26.107 Then, the court will apply the two-step 
Zubulake test to determine whether cost-shifting is appropriate.108 After 
analyzing accessibility and the seven factors, the court may deny cost-
shifting,109 shift some of the costs,110 or deny a particularly burdensome 
e-discovery request.111 
The first step of the Zubulake test is the accessibility analysis.112 The 
analysis begins with the general presumption that the producing party 
must pay for the costs of e-discovery.113 The Zubulake test allows cost-
shifting for data that the court finds was “inaccessible” at the time the 
litigation commenced.114 Data is inaccessible if it creates an undue 
burden or expense for the producing party.115 Although a finding of 
inaccessibility is crucial to cost-shifting, courts have not agreed on a 
common standard for defining inaccessibility.116 In Zubulake, the court 
                                                     
106. See, e.g., SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 38, at 313; Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery 
Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a 
Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 904 (2009). 
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
108. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“In order to search the tapes for 
responsive e-mails, UBS would have to engage in the costly and time-consuming process detailed 
above. It is therefore appropriate to consider cost shifting.” (emphasis in original)). 
109. See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 640 (D. Kan. 2006). 
110. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 577 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (shifting 
seventy-five percent of the costs); Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (shifting 
twenty-five percent of the costs). 
111. See, e.g., Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-1445 (NPM/DEP), 2011 WL 
2154279, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011) (no e-discovery unless the requesting party agrees to 
bear all the costs of e-discovery, with an exception for class certification). 
112. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318–20. 
113. Id. at 317. 
114. See id. at 324; see also Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 
F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (determining that it is appropriate to consider cost-shifting 
for ESI that had become inaccessible by the time the litigation commenced). 
115. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318. 
116. Compare id. (defining inaccessibility based on the ESI’s storage format), with OpenTV v. 
Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 476–77 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (defining inaccessibility based on the 
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reasoned that an accessibility determination should depend “primarily on 
whether [the ESI] is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format.”117 
Zubulake listed five categories of data storage formats that existed in 
2003 and identified three of them as “accessible” and the other two as 
“inaccessible.”118 Post-Zubulake, some courts followed Zubulake in 
defining accessibility in terms of the requested ESI’s format.119 Other 
courts interpreted accessibility in terms of the total cost to produce the 
requested ESI.120 Courts are currently split on whether to use Zubulake’s 
“format” accessibility standard or the alternative “total cost” 
accessibility standard.121 Under either standard, courts would order the 
production of accessible data without cost-shifting and would continue 
to the second step of the Zubulake test for inaccessible data.122 
The second step of the Zubulake test is a seven-factor test that 
determines whether there will be cost-shifting.123 The seven factors are: 
(1) The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to 
discover relevant information; 
                                                     
total cost of production). 
117. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318 (emphasis in original). The court’s use of the phrase 
“accessible format” to describe items that pass the accessibility step assumes that certain types of 
data are more “accessible” and therefore pose less of a burden to the producing party than other 
types of data. However, because the volume of requested ESI is a major driver of e-discovery costs, 
the producing party might have to incur high e-discovery costs for broad e-discovery requests, 
regardless of the ESI’s format. See W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38, 43 (D. 
Mass. 2007) (finding data in an “accessible” format nonetheless “inaccessible” because “retrieval 
would involve undue burden or cost”); see also SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 38, at 313 (“The 
costs of processing such voluminous amounts of data to find the few nuggets that are relevant to a 
specific litigation . . . are staggering.”). 
118. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318–20. The three types of accessible data were “[a]ctive, online 
data,” “[n]ear-line data,” and “[o]ffline storage/archives.” Id. at 318–19. Active, online data 
includes hard drives, near-line data includes optical disks, and offline storage/archives include 
removable optical disks and magnetic tape media. Id. The two types of inaccessible data were 
“[b]ackup tapes” and “[e]rased, fragmented or damaged data.” Id. at 319–20.  
119. Some courts still apply this “format” accessibility approach. See, e.g., Sundown Energy, L.P. 
v. Haller, No. 10-4354, 2011 WL 5079329, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2011) (denying cost-shifting 
because the producing party asserted that an e-discovery request is costly but failed to show that the 
requested ESI is stored in an inaccessible format); Canon U.S.A., Inc. v. S.A.M., Inc., No. 07-
01201, 2008 WL 2522087, at *5 (E.D. La. June 20, 2008) (denying cost-shifting for e-discovery of 
ESI on a server because the ESI was in an active format). 
120. See, e.g., W.E. Aubuchon Co., 245 F.R.D. at 43 (finding ESI in an “accessible” format 
inaccessible because the e-discovery would create an “undue burden or cost”); see also OpenTV, 
219 F.R.D. at 476–77 (“Accessibility turns largely on the expense of production.”). 
121. Compare Sundown Energy, L.P., 2011 WL 5079329, at *4 (applying format accessibility), 
with W.E. Aubuchon Co., 245 F.R.D. at 43 (applying total cost accessibility). 
122. See Peskoff v. Faber (Peskoff I), 240 F.R.D. 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[C]ost-shifting does not 
even become a possibility unless there is first a showing of inaccessibility.”). 
123. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322. 
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(2) The availability of such information from other sources; 
(3) The total cost of production, compared to the amount in 
controversy; 
(4) The total cost of production, compared to the resources 
available to each party; 
(5) The relative ability of each party to control costs and its 
incentive to do so; 
(6) The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 
(7) The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the 
information.124 
To aid judges in making the cost-shifting determination, the Zubulake 
test groups the seven factors into three categories based on their relative 
importance: (1) the marginal utility test, (2) cost factors, and (3) other 
factors.125 
1.  The First Category of Factors, the Marginal Utility Test, Includes 
the Two Most Important Factors of the Zubulake Test 
The “marginal utility test,” which originated in McPeek,126 includes 
the first two factors in the second step of the Zubulake test: (1) “[t]he 
extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant 
information,” and (2) “the availability of such information from other 
sources.”127 These two factors are the most important in the Zubulake 
test because “[t]he more likely it is that the backup tape contains 
information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that the 
[responding party] search at its own expense.”128 
The first factor centers on specificity.129 Sometimes, a court will 
perform a sample search of the requested ESI to determine whether an e-
discovery request is specific.130 In a sample search, the court will have 
                                                     
124. Id. 
125. See id. at 322–23. Zubulake separated the last two factors into separate groups, but 
subsequent cases have considered the two factors to be of similar weight. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB 
Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 576 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (lumping the last two factors into a 
“remaining factors” category). 
126. McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001). The McPeek version of the marginal 
utility test posited that it would be fairer to shift the costs to the requesting party if it is less likely 
that the request would generate relevant results. See id.  
127. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323. 
128. Id. (quoting McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 324. For a detailed explanation of how courts use sample searches to determine 
accessibility, see SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 38, at 290–95. 
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the parties pick certain keywords.131 Then, the producing party will use 
these keywords to search specified sources of ESI and report back to the 
court how many results they found and how relevant those results 
were.132 The judge will then consider the results and determine whether 
the Zubulake test favors cost-shifting.133 Sometimes, courts will narrow 
the scope of the discovery request before ordering cost-shifting.134 
Usually, courts favor cost-shifting if the e-discovery request is not 
specifically tailored to discover critical information.135 
The second factor focuses on availability.136 If the requested 
information is already available to the requesting party, then the 
marginal benefit of additional e-discovery is low.137 In one case, the 
court denied additional e-discovery when the court found that the 
producing party had already produced four hundred pages of e-mails.138 
Generally, courts favor cost-shifting if the requested information is 
available from other more accessible sources.139 
2. The Next Three Factors, the Cost Factors, Weigh the Costs of E-
Discovery Against the Benefits and Importance of the Request to 
the Requesting Party 
Factors three, four, and five of the Zubulake test address cost 
issues.140 These cost factors take into account the total cost of e-
discovery, as well as which party would be in a better position to bear 
those costs.141 Although courts give less weight to the cost factors than 
the two factors in the marginal utility test, the cost factors are more 
important than factors six and seven.142 
The third factor of the Zubulake test, and the most important cost 
factor, is “[t]he total cost of production, compared to the amount in 
                                                     
131. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 570 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
132. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324. 
133. Id. 
134. Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 106–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
135. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 572. 
136. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323. 
137. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 574. 
138. Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-1445 (NPM/DEP), 2011 WL 2154279, at 
*6, *9 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011). 
139. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 574. 
140. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
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controversy.”143 Usually, this factor favors cost-shifting if the total cost 
of production significantly outweighs the amount in controversy.144 
The fourth factor of the Zubulake test, and the second most important 
cost factor, is “[t]he total cost of production, compared to the resources 
available to each party.”145 This factor favors cost-shifting if one party is 
better able to pay the costs of production or when one party has 
significantly more assets than the other.146 
The fifth and least important cost factor of the Zubulake test is “[t]he 
relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do 
so.”147 One court stated that, “[i]n most cases, both parties will likely 
have the ability and desire to control costs.”148 However, in one case, the 
court found that the producing party had a better ability to control costs 
because it controlled and had better knowledge of the database that held 
the requested ESI.149 Usually, this factor favors cost-shifting if the 
requesting party is better able to control costs or has a better incentive to 
do so.150 
3.  The Last Two Factors of the Zubulake Test Consider Other, Less 
Important Factors 
The sixth factor of the Zubulake test is “[t]he importance of the issues 
at stake in the litigation.”151 This factor favors cost-shifting in cases that 
are not “unique or novel in nature.”152 So far, courts have found that the 
                                                     
143. Id. at 322–23. 
144. See, e.g., OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that the 
total cost of production does not significantly outweigh the amount in controversy, which could 
potentially be “hundreds of thousands of dollars”); Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (finding that the total cost of production does not significantly outweigh the amount in 
controversy, which could be in millions of dollars). 
145. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322–23. 
146. See Xpedior Credit Trust v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“CSFB USA alone had net revenues of $5.7 billion in fiscal year 2002. Xpedior is 
a bankrupt corporation with virtually no assets . . . . CSFB’s assets clearly dwarf Xpedior’s. This 
factor weighs against cost-shifting.” (emphasis in original)). 
147. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322–23.  
148. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 576 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
149. OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478–79 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
150. See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that this factor is neutral 
because the requesting party is better able to control costs and does not have a better incentive to do 
so). 
151. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322–23. 
152. See Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 640 (D. Kan. 2006) (citing Zubulake III, 
216 F.R.D. at 289); see also Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321 (“For example, if a case has the potential 
for broad public impact, then public policy weighs heavily in favor of permitting extensive 
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sixth factor is neutral in cases involving intellectual property 
infringement153 and gender discrimination,154 on grounds that such cases 
are not unique.155 
The seventh factor of the Zubulake test is “[t]he relative benefits to 
the parties of obtaining the information.”156 This factor is the least 
important because the requesting party has more to gain from e-
discovery than the producing party.157 Nevertheless, one court has found 
e-discovery to also help the producing party when the producing party 
could use the information produced for another lawsuit.158 
After analyzing the seven factors, the court will assess whether the 
factors favor cost-shifting.159 Courts determine the amount of costs to be 
shifted based on “judgment and fairness” rather than a “mathematical 
consequence of the seven factors.”160 Courts might deny cost-shifting,161 
shift some of the costs,162 or deny a particularly burdensome e-discovery 
request.163 
B.  Although Most Courts Will Consider Shifting Preservation and 
Production Costs, They Are Reluctant to Shift Review Costs 
Some courts have discussed the possibility of shifting ESI 
preservation costs.164 One court noted that cost-shifting may be an 
appropriate alternative to complete denial of a preservation request 
                                                     
discovery. Cases of this ilk might include toxic tort class actions, environmental actions, so-called 
‘impact’ or social reform litigation, cases involving criminal conduct, or cases implicating important 
legal or constitutional questions.”). 
153. OpenTV, 219 F.R.D. at 479. 
154. Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 289. 
155. OpenTV, 219 F.R.D. at 479 (stating that “there is no indication that this case presents novel 
issues”); Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 289 (stating that the case “does not present a particularly novel 
issue”). 
156. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322–23. 
157. Id. at 323. 
158. Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466–67 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). The seventh factor was neutral in that case. Id. at 467. 
159. Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 289. 
160. Id. 
161. See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 640 (D. Kan. 2006). 
162. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 577 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Zubulake 
III, 216 F.R.D. at 291. 
163. See, e.g., Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-1445 (NPM/DEP), 2011 WL 
2154279, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011). 
164. Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Capricorn Power Co. v. 
Siemens Westinghouse Power Corp., 220 F.R.D. 429, 436 (W.D. Pa. 2004). 
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where the requesting party “seeks the preservation of information that is 
likely to be of only marginal relevance but is costly to retain.”165 
Another court noted that cost-shifting may be appropriate when ordering 
a non-party to preserve ESI.166 
The Zubulake court articulated the cost-shifting test167 and 
subsequently applied the seven factors in a later ruling.168 Since then, 
many courts have followed the Zubulake court in shifting production 
costs.169 Courts generally will consider shifting the costs of restoring and 
searching ESI.170 However, the producing party is responsible for paying 
the costs of rectifying any unexpected glitches that arise during the 
course of e-discovery.171 
Even though analysts have estimated that eighty percent of e-
discovery costs are review costs,172 most courts will not shift review 
costs.173 One reason for this is that the producing party can decide for 
itself how it wants to review the ESI and how much to spend on review 
costs prior to turning the ESI over to the requesting party.174 
Nevertheless, the general rule against shifting review costs is not 
absolute.175 In Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel,176 the court made an 
exception that allows cost-shifting for review costs in situations in which 
the requesting party insists on the retrieval of redundant information.177 
                                                     
165. Treppel, 233 F.R.D. at 373. 
166. Capricorn Power Co., 220 F.R.D. at 436. 
167. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
168. Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
169. See e.g., In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 MD 1695(CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 
983987, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007) (“The major case of Zubulake . . . set[s] forth a widely 
followed standard for determining when cost shifting is appropriate.”).  
170. See Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. CIV. 05-3091(JBS/JS), 2009 WL 3446761, at *6 
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009); Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 290. 
171. PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657(DNH/RFT), 2007 
WL 2687670, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007). 
172. Talley, supra note 77. 
173. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 577 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Zubulake 
III, 216 F.R.D. at 290; Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
174. See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 290. 
175. See Major Tours, Inc., 2009 WL 3446761, at *6. 
176. No. CIV. 05-3091(JBS/JS), 2009 WL 3446761 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009). 
177. Id. at *6 (“If plaintiffs request a review of the March 2006 tapes they shall pay all retrieval 
costs, including the cost of defendants’ relevancy and privilege review. This is equitable given the 
redundancy of the March 2006 tapes.”). 
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C.  Courts Generally Refuse to Shift Costs for Parties that 
Intentionally Engage in Costly or Dilatory Discovery Practices 
In general, courts do not want the producing party to create its own 
burdens and then expect the court to shift that burden to the requesting 
party.178 Therefore, courts will not allow cost-shifting for a party that 
intentionally makes previously accessible data inaccessible to “create[] 
its own burden or expense.”179 Courts will also not allow cost-shifting 
for a producing party that fails to perform e-discovery searches, fails to 
provide documents from a certain relevant time period, or fails to 
preserve data.180 One court denied cost-shifting when the producing 
party asked for cost-shifting after it had incurred e-discovery costs.181 
Generally, producing parties will provide the court with cost estimates 
prior to commencing e-discovery to help the court determine whether 
there should be cost-shifting in advance.182 
D.  Courts Have Identified Some Advantages and Disadvantages of 
Cost-Shifting 
Courts have identified three main disadvantages of cost-shifting in e-
discovery: it could undermine the public policy of resolving lawsuits on 
their merits,183 it could limit economically disadvantaged plaintiffs’ 
access to justice,184 and it could encourage defendants to create needless 
costs for themselves, thereby triggering cost-shifting analysis.185 The 
court in Zubulake recognized those disadvantages and therefore limited 
cost-shifting to situations in which “electronic discovery imposes an 
                                                     
178. See Peskoff v. Faber (Peskoff IV), 251 F.R.D. 59, 62–63 (D.D.C. 2008); Quinby v. WestLB 
AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 104–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
179. See Quinby, 245 F.R.D. at 104.  
180. Peskoff IV, 251 F.R.D. at 62–63. 
181. Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 06-15601, 2008 WL 2714239, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 
July 7, 2008). 
182. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the 
party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost.”). Parties usually hold a pre-trial conference to discuss discovery 
issues. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f); see Michael D. Berman, The Rule 26(f) Conference of the Parties, in 
MANAGING E-DISCOVERY AND ESI 421–33 (Michael D. Berman et al. eds., 2011). 
183. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
184. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
185. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 635 (D. Kan. 2006). The third disadvantage is 
less of a concern than the previous two because courts generally do not allow cost-shifting when the 
producing party creates needless costs for itself. See supra Part II.C. 
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‘undue burden or expense’ on the responding party.”186 To mitigate the 
impact of the three disadvantages, parties could also discuss in a pre-trial 
conference whether to use a neutral third party, known as a special 
master, to mediate discovery disputes, allocate costs, and facilitate e-
discovery.187 
Although there are some disadvantages to cost-shifting, courts have 
identified many advantages. First, it can protect producing parties from 
being unduly burdened by costly e-discovery.188 Second, cost-shifting 
can allow requesting parties to access crucial documents even when e-
discovery is too costly relative to its benefits to justify placing the entire 
burden on the producing party; the alternative would be outright denial 
of expensive discovery requests.189 Third, cost-shifting can discourage 
requesting parties from making overly broad e-discovery requests,190 
which require the producing party to provide a lot of information, only 
some of which is relevant to the case.191 Finally, cost-shifting can 
prevent plaintiffs from using e-discovery as a tool to force the defendant 
to settle.192 
III.  COURTS HAVE NOT SETTLED ON HOW TO ADDRESS THE 
COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL E-DISCOVERY 
In general, FRCP 26 applies to all e-discovery requests in a federal 
district court regardless of the location of the ESI sought.193 Therefore, 
FRCP 26 generally applies to international e-discovery, which is the 
discovery of ESI located outside of the United States.194 Nonetheless, 
international e-discovery may implicate international treaties, such as the 
                                                     
186. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318, 320. The Zubulake court modified the eight-factor test from 
Rowe partly because all the courts that applied the Rowe test granted cost-shifting even when doing 
so might prevent meritorious litigation. Id. at 320. 
187. See Michael D. Berman, Alternative Dispute Resolution of E-Discovery Issues, in 
MANAGING E-DISCOVERY AND ESI, supra note 182, at 619, 619–21. 
188. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318. 
189. Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-1445 (NPM/DEP), 2011 WL 2154279, at 
*13 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011). In this case, the costs of e-discovery substantially outweigh the 
benefits, but the court nonetheless allowed e-discovery if the requesting party was willing to bear 
the costs. Id. 
190. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
191. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 571 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
192. See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001). 
193. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (defining the scope of the FRCP as governing “all civil actions and 
proceedings in the United States district courts”). 
194. See Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying 
the FRCP to an international discovery request). 
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Hague Convention, and foreign blocking statutes.195 Furthermore, 
international e-discovery may involve additional costs, though courts 
have not settled on a way to address those costs.196 
A.  Courts Usually Allow International E-Discovery, Subject to Some 
Restrictions 
Courts have generally allowed international e-discovery, subject to a 
balancing of American interests with foreign interests.197 American 
interests include enforcement of American laws and protection of 
American citizens from harm by foreign parties.198 Foreign interests 
might include protecting foreign citizens from “intrusive discovery 
procedures”199 and ensuring foreign bank confidentiality.200 In order to 
protect their interests, some foreign countries have passed “blocking 
statutes,” which restrict discovery.201 France has enacted a blocking 
statute that prohibits international discovery unless the discovery is 
conducted pursuant to procedures specified in a treaty such as the Hague 
Convention, which the United States, France, and other countries have 
ratified.202 Several countries, including China,203 Malaysia,204 the 
Netherlands,205 and Switzerland,206 have similar blocking statutes. 
                                                     
195. See infra Part III.A. 
196. See infra Part III.B–C. 
197. See, e.g., Munoz v. China Expert Tech., Inc., No. 07 CIV. 10531 (AKH), 2011 WL 
5346323, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011); Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 452 
(C.D. Cal. 2007); see also Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of 
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 (1987) (describing the balancing analysis). 
198. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 527 (indicating protection of 
American citizens from harmful foreign products and compensation of Americans injured by 
harmful foreign products as American interests to consider); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 
F.R.D. 199, 213–14 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (naming prevention of terrorist funding as an important 
American interest). 
199. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 527. 
200. See Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“China’s 
multitude of criminal and civil regulations on the subject also evidence its strong interest in bank 
confidentiality.”). 
201. See, e.g., Strauss, 242 F.R.D. at 220 (describing French blocking statute). 
202. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 526 n.6 (citing French and English 
language versions of the French blocking statute). 
203. Tiffany (NJ) LLC, 276 F.R.D. at 150 (describing Chinese blocking statutes). 
204. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458 (RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010). 
205. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL 2080419, at *11 
(C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). 
206. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 525, 531–32 (D.N.J. 2009). 
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In certain circumstances, however, U.S. courts will authorize e-
discovery of ESI located abroad notwithstanding the prohibitions of the 
relevant nation’s blocking statute. In Société Nationale Industrielle 
Aérospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Iowa,207 a 1987 case in which American plaintiffs sued two corporations 
owned by the French government, the U.S. Supreme Court established a 
five-factor test, known as the comity analysis, to determine whether an 
American court should allow international discovery despite an 
applicable blocking statute.208 The five factors are: 
(1) the importance to the . . . litigation of the documents or other 
information requested; 
(2) the degree of specificity of the request; 
(3) whether the information originated in the United States; 
(4) the availability of alternative means of securing the 
information; and 
(5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would 
undermine important interests of the United States, or 
compliance with the request would undermine important 
interests of the state where the information is located.209 
The Court derived the five factors from a draft of what is now § 442 of 
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States.210 In Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, the Court stated 
that any comity analysis should include the five factors but did not 
characterize the factors as exclusive.211 Since 1987, many lower federal 
courts have applied the five Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale 
factors when performing a comity analysis.212 
                                                     
207. 482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
208. Id. at 544 n.28. 
209. Id. 
210. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c) (1987) 
(articulating the five-factor comity analysis). 
211. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28 (“While we recognize that 
§ 437 of the Restatement may not represent a consensus of international views on the scope of the 
district court’s power to order foreign discovery in the face of objections by foreign states, these 
factors are relevant to any comity analysis . . . .”). The Second Circuit subsequently added two 
factors: “hardship of compliance and good faith.” Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 
211 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citations omitted). However, the Second Circuit approach still places more 
weight on the fifth factor of the original comity analysis, which balances American interests and 
foreign interests, than on any of the subsequently added two factors. Id.  
212. See SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 329 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (applying 
the five factors in a case involving international e-discovery of computer records and e-mails and 
citing other cases that have applied the five-factor test).  
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Though courts usually conduct international discovery under the 
FRCP, they sometimes proceed under the Hague Convention,213 which 
requires a judicial authority of the United States to request permission 
from another signatory country before ordering discovery in that 
country.214 As a treaty made under the authority of the United States, the 
Hague Convention is constitutionally part of the supreme law of the 
United States.215 However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Société 
Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale that the Hague Convention is neither 
applicable to all cases of international discovery nor the only way to 
conduct discovery on documents or data in a foreign country.216 The 
Court noted that the treaty’s express purpose is to “improve mutual 
judicial co-operation in civil or commercial matters,” and the treaty does 
not expressly purport to control international discovery.217 Therefore, the 
Court concluded that the Hague Convention is only applicable if a court 
finds it to be so based on the facts of the case, sovereign interests, and 
the likelihood that resorting to the Convention’s procedures will prove 
effective.218 Since Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, few lower 
courts have ordered discovery under the Hague Convention.219 Many 
courts find the Hague Convention’s method of international discovery 
slow and expensive, and therefore likely to result in additional costs for 
the producing party.220 
In sum, items and data located outside the United States are generally 
discoverable in an American court to the same extent as domestically-
                                                     
213. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 
30; see also Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 160–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (ordering 
the use of the Hague Convention for discovery). 
214. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 
30, art. 2. 
215. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
216. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 
522, 533–34 (1987). 
217. Id. at 534. 
218. Id. at 544 (articulating this three-factor test); see Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator 
Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 525, 528–29 (D.N.J. 2009) (applying the three-factor test). However, some 
cases apply the five-factor comity analysis to determine whether to proceed under the FRCP or the 
Hague Convention. See, e.g., SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 329–30 (N.D. 
Tex. 2011) (applying the five factors plus the two added factors from the Second Circuit).  
219. THOMAS MAIN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 52–53 (2008) (“[I]n the majority of 
cases the Hague Convention is held not to apply.”). 
220. See Schindler Elevator Corp., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 530 (“It has been the experience of this and 
many other courts that utilization of Hague procedures are slow and cumbersome and usually take 
far longer than discovery procedures under the Federal Rules.”).  
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housed information.221 Federal district courts apply the five-factor 
comity test from Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale to decide 
whether to allow discovery despite foreign blocking statutes.222 The 
Hague Convention provides another set of rules for conducting 
international discovery.223 Courts use a three-factor test to determine 
whether to conduct international discovery under the FRCP or the Hague 
Convention.224 To date, however, few courts have elected to apply the 
Hague Convention’s discovery provisions.225 
B.  International E-Discovery Has Unique Costs, Including Costs 
Associated with the Transportation and Transmission of ESI, 
Translation, and Blocking Statute Fines 
E-discovery entails preservation, production, and review costs no 
matter where the requested ESI is located.226 In addition to the usual 
costs of e-discovery, however, international e-discovery may entail 
unique expenses associated with transmitting or transporting the ESI to 
the United States,227 translating the ESI into English,228 and incurring 
monetary fines from foreign governments for violations of foreign 
blocking statutes.229 
Transmitting or transporting the ESI to the United States can be very 
                                                     
221. See MAIN, supra note 219, at 52–53.  
222. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28 (articulating the five-factor 
comity analysis); see also Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 
707012, at *2–7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012) (applying five-factor comity analysis plus the two factors 
from the Second Circuit to allow discovery despite French blocking statute); Devon Robotics v. 
DeViedma, No. 09-CV-3552, 2010 WL 3985877, at *4–6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2010) (applying five-
factor comity analysis to allow discovery despite Italian blocking statute). 
223. See Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra 
note 30. 
224. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544. 
225. See MAIN, supra note 219, at 52–53. 
226. See Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2007) 
(involving preservation and production of server log data located in the Netherlands). 
227. See United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 272 F.R.D. 235, 240–41 (D.D.C. 
2011) (denying additional e-discovery in part because of the high costs of transporting or 
transmitting the data). But see AccessData Corp. v. ALSTE Techs. GmbH, No. 2:08CV569, 2010 
WL 318477, at *2 (D. Utah Jan. 21, 2010) (“[T]he costs of transmitting information and electronic 
documents ought to be relatively minimal.”). 
228. DATICON ELEC. EVIDENCE DISCOVERY, INC., supra note 24, at 5. 
229. See The French Supreme Court Applies the 1980 Blocking Statute for the First Time and 
Strengthens the Conditions Under Which Evidence To Be Used in Foreign Litigation Can Be 
Obtained in France, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 17, 2008), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/FrenchSupremeCourtApplies1980BlockingStatute.
aspx. 
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expensive, especially if there is a lot of data to transmit or transport.230 
Parties might need to incur expenses in encrypting collected ESI and 
making a backup copy of the ESI, in case the data is lost during 
transportation.231 Although one federal district court opined that 
transmission costs for ESI “ought to be relatively minimal,”232 another 
district court denied an e-discovery request entirely when the court 
found that the request would have required the producing party to ship or 
transmit the data to the United States at great expense.233 
ESI in a foreign country is sometimes in a language other than 
English,234 and it is costly to translate the data.235 In one case, the 
plaintiffs requested a variety of electronic documents from a non-party 
European trade association.236 The trade association objected, stating 
that “many of the documents . . . may be written in a variety of 
languages, necessitating an expensive and time-consuming process of 
translation.”237 Ultimately, the court granted international e-discovery 
but required the requesting party to pay the producing non-party’s e-
discovery expenses.238 
For the most part, American courts have ordered discovery despite 
foreign blocking statutes.239 This creates a dilemma for producing 
parties. On one hand, complying with the American court’s discovery 
order could mean that the producing party would have to violate a 
foreign blocking statute, which could result in fines and/or jail time.240 
On the other hand, not complying with the American court’s discovery 
order would subject the producing party to sanctions in the American 
                                                     
230. See United States ex rel. McBride, 272 F.R.D. at 240–41. 
231. See Bryan S. Kim, E-Discovery Challenges on Global Matters, PWC (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/compliance-week-edisc-
article.pdf. 
232. AccessData Corp., 2010 WL 318477, at *2. 
233. See United States ex rel. McBride, 272 F.R.D. at 240–41.  
234. DATICON ELEC. EVIDENCE DISCOVERY, INC., supra note 24, at 5. 
235. Id. 
236. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482, 484–85 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
237. Opposition of Non-Party Counseil Européen De L’Industrie Des Peintures, Des Encres 
D’Imprimeríe Et Des Couleurs D’Art to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Response to Subpoena at 13, 
In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (No. 10-MD-1426) 
[hereinafter Opposition of CEPE]. 
238. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 496. 
239. See Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 707012, at *2–7 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012) (allowing discovery despite French blocking statute); Devon Robotics v. 
DeViedma, No. 09-CV-3552, 2010 WL 3985877, at *4–6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2010) (allowing 
discovery despite Italian blocking statute). 
240. See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 229. 
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court.241 Thus, monetary fines from a foreign country may be an 
additional cost of conducting international e-discovery.242 
C.  Few Courts Have Addressed the Costs of International 
E-Discovery 
Courts have seldom addressed the costs of international e-discovery. 
In one case, a federal district court summarily rejected a producing 
party’s objection that international e-discovery is too costly, observing 
that “the costs of transmitting information and electronic documents 
ought to be relatively minimal.”243 Another federal district court 
dismissed a producing party’s objection that international e-discovery is 
unduly expensive after finding that the producing party had inflated the 
cost estimates.244 There are, however, two illustrative cases in which 
courts addressed the costs of international e-discovery.245 
In one case, the court denied a burdensome international e-discovery 
request altogether.246 In United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton 
Co.,247 McBride, a qui tam248 plaintiff, sued Halliburton for inflating 
costs on invoices and thereby overcharging the U.S. government for 
services Halliburton provided during the Iraq War.249 After conducting 
one round of e-discovery, which cost Halliburton $650,000, McBride 
sought to conduct another round of e-discovery.250 Halliburton objected 
on grounds of undue burden and expense.251 Some of the requested files 
were located outside the United States, so Halliburton would have had to 
                                                     
241. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A); see also United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1291 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (“Possible criminal liability in Switzerland does not preclude enforcement and 
sanctions.”). 
242. See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 229. 
243. AccessData Corp. v. ALSTE Techs. GmbH, No. 2:08CV569, 2010 WL 318477, at *2 (D. 
Utah Jan. 21, 2010). 
244. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL 2080419, at *8 (C.D. 
Cal. May 29, 2007). 
245. United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 272 F.R.D. 235 (D.D.C. 2011); In re Auto. 
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
246. United States ex rel. McBride, 272 F.R.D. at 243. 
247. 272 F.R.D. 235 (D.D.C. 2011). 
248. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “qui tam action” as “[a]n action 
brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the 
government or some specified public institution will receive”). 
249. United States ex rel. McBride, 272 F.R.D. at 236. 
250. Id. at 241. 
251. Id. at 240. 
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ship or electronically transmit the data from abroad.252 The additional 
search would have involved records from thirty-five custodians, and it 
would have taken two to ten days to collect the data from each 
custodian.253 The court denied the entire request for additional e-
discovery because the court found that Halliburton had already provided 
some information at great expense, and that McBride had failed to show 
what the additional information would add to the case.254 
In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation involved 
allegations of price fixing against several manufacturers of automotive 
paint.255 During discovery, the plaintiffs demanded ESI from a foreign, 
non-party trade association, Conseil Européen de l’Industrie des 
Peintures, des Encres d’Imprimeríe et des Couleurs d’Art (CEPE).256 
CEPE objected on grounds of undue expense.257 CEPE argued that the 
request covered a broad range of documents, electronic files, and e-mail 
from 1990 to 2005 and would require CEPE to contract with experts to 
produce the ESI.258 Furthermore, CEPE’s files were in languages other 
than English, so CEPE would incur translation costs by complying with 
the request.259 The court allowed cost-shifting and ordered the plaintiffs 
to compensate CEPE for production costs.260 A few other courts have 
ordered cost-shifting for international e-discovery, but did not explain 
how the comity concerns and unique costs of international e-discovery 
affect the cost-shifting analysis.261 
IV.  COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE ZUBULAKE TEST WITH A 
PRELIMINARY COMITY ANALYSIS AND ADOPT AN 
ESCROW SYSTEM 
Although courts have allowed cost-shifting for international 
e-discovery on a variety of grounds,262 none of those courts have 
                                                     
252. Id. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 241. 
255. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482, 484 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
256. Id. at 485. CEPE’s English name is “European Council of the Paint, Printing Ink and Artists’ 
Colours Industry.” Id. at 483. 
257. Id. at 495. 
258. Opposition of CEPE, supra note 237, at 12–13. 
259. Id. at 13. 
260. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 496.  
261. See, e.g., U & I Corp. v. Advanced Med. Design, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 667, 677 (M.D. Fla. 
2008); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 100, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
262. See generally, e.g., U & I Corp., 251 F.R.D. 667; Quinby, 245 F.R.D. 94; In re Auto. 
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considered the comity concerns implicated by international e-discovery 
requests.263 Furthermore, none of those courts have articulated a 
framework to guide courts when they analyze requests to shift the costs 
of international e-discovery.264 Therefore, there is currently no approach 
that adequately addresses both the comity concerns and the unique costs 
of international e-discovery. 
This Comment’s approach addresses both the comity concerns and 
the unique costs of international e-discovery. First, courts should address 
comity concerns by prefacing the Zubulake test in international e-
discovery cases with a comity analysis. Second, they should address cost 
concerns by extending the Zubulake test to all e-discovery, allowing 
cost-shifting for certain unique costs of international e-discovery, and 
defining “accessibility” in terms of total cost instead of storage format. 
Third, to effectuate cost-shifting, courts should adopt an escrow system 
whereby the requesting party deposits a portion of the shifted costs with 
the court. 
A.  Courts Should Preface the Zubulake Test with a Comity Analysis 
When evaluating international e-discovery requests, courts should 
consider international politics, sovereign interests, and international 
comity concerns. Some foreign countries have enacted blocking statutes 
to limit the discovery that American courts can order within their 
territory.265 Although blocking statutes are not absolute bars to 
international e-discovery,266 they reflect the interests of foreign 
countries.267 Foreign countries may also assert their interests through 
other means, such as through privacy laws.268 Courts should recognize 
foreign interests by applying the five-factor comity analysis used in 
                                                     
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482. 
263. See generally, e.g., U & I Corp., 251 F.R.D. 667; Quinby, 245 F.R.D. 94; In re Auto. 
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482.  
264. See generally, e.g., U & I Corp., 251 F.R.D. 667; Quinby, 245 F.R.D. 94; In re Auto. 
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482. 
265. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Chinese 
blocking statutes); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (French 
blocking statute). 
266. Strauss, 242 F.R.D. at 220 (“[C]ourts in [the Second Circuit] have already examined the 
French bank secrecy law and blocking statute, and denied their applicability to preclude 
discovery.”). 
267. See Tiffany (NJ) LLC, 276 F.R.D. at 157 (“China’s multitude of criminal and civil 
regulations on the subject also evidence its strong interest in bank confidentiality.”). 
268. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 27, at 10–13 (describing the European Union’s 
Data Protection Directive). 
17 -- Yip FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/4/2012 9:15 PM 
2012] INTERNATIONAL E-DISCOVERY 623 
 
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale.269 
Starting with the comity analysis allows courts to address as a 
preliminary matter the special concerns that arise when a party is 
compelled to disclose information located in a foreign state. The comity 
analysis allows courts to determine the potential negative effects of an 
international e-discovery request on foreign relations.270 It would be 
difficult to conduct international e-discovery without the cooperation, or 
at least the tacit acquiescence, of the foreign country where the requested 
ESI is located.271 As such, courts should consider the totality of the 
circumstances for any particular international e-discovery request, 
including the likely impact on relations with the relevant foreign nation. 
In some situations, the court might determine that an e-discovery request 
so violates international comity that the request should be denied or 
should be granted only subject to court-ordered modification.272 
The comity analysis would also allow courts to narrow the 
international e-discovery request. For example, if e-discovery in the 
United States has already established certain key facts and the requesting 
party only needs limited foreign documents, then the court and the 
parties could agree to narrow the e-discovery request. An international e-
discovery request with a narrower scope is more likely to pass the 
                                                     
269. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 
522, 544 n.28 (1987). Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale suggested that the purpose of the 
five-factor comity analysis is to perform a “more particularized analysis of the respective interests 
of the foreign nation and the requesting nation . . . .” Id. at 543–44. Although a foreign nation’s 
interests might be better expressed and stronger when that nation has a blocking statute, the U.S. 
Supreme Court did not expressly require that there be a blocking statute before a court may apply 
the five-factor comity analysis. See id. The U.S. Supreme Court indicated that a court may apply the 
five-factor comity analysis when determining the “scope of the district court’s power to order 
foreign discovery in the face of objections by foreign states.” Id. at 544 n.28. 
270. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c) (1987). One factor of 
the comity analysis is whether “compliance with the request would undermine important interests of 
the state where the information is located.” Id.  
271. See Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 523–24 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (explaining that 
discovery could lead to bitter disputes between judges of different countries and stating that there 
should be constructive cooperation “[w]here the involvement of two judicial systems genuinely is 
required . . . .”); see also Regulatory Cooperation in International E-Discovery, LAW360 (Dec. 2, 
2009), http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/bacd6451-1c43-4223-b53b-3d625f511d8e/Prese
ntation/PublicationAttachment/3c2487b3-4a52-4076-9286-3f574e7c565d/Regulatory%20Cooperati
on.pdf (describing a situation where IRS cooperation with Swiss authorities facilitated the execution 
of an otherwise contentious e-discovery request). 
272. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442 cmt. a (1987) (“Given the 
difficulty in obtaining compliance, and the resistance of foreign states to discovery demands 
originating in the United States, it is ordinarily reasonable to limit foreign discovery to information 
necessary to the action—typically, evidence not otherwise readily obtainable—and directly relevant 
and material.”). 
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comity analysis273 and is also more likely to result in less, or even no, 
cost-shifting against the requesting party.274 
Finally, the comity analysis promotes judicial economy. Instead of 
considering and deciding comity concerns and cost-shifting matters in 
separate proceedings, the court can consider both by prefacing the 
Zubulake cost-shifting analysis with a comity analysis in cases involving 
international e-discovery. 
B.  Courts Should Extend the Zubulake Cost-Shifting Test to All 
Discoverable ESI, Generally Allow Cost-Shifting for Transmission 
and Transportation Costs, and Define “Accessibility” in Terms of 
Total Costs Instead of Storage Format 
Domestic e-discovery and international e-discovery share many 
similarities. Both involve the general steps of preservation, production, 
and review.275 Both can have high costs due to the large volumes of 
available ESI.276 Courts already shift costs for e-discovery of ESI in the 
United States.277 Few courts have considered cost-shifting for 
international e-discovery even though international ESI has additional e-
discovery costs.278 The similarities between e-discovery of ESI in the 
United States and international e-discovery make cost-shifting 
appropriate in international e-discovery. Courts should extend the 
Zubulake test to international e-discovery instead of creating a separate 
test for allocating the costs of international e-discovery. 
1.  Extending the Zubulake Test to All E-Discovery Promotes Fairness 
and Judicial Economy 
There is currently no consensus as to the proper test for cost-shifting 
                                                     
273. See id. § 442(1)(c). The second factor of the comity analysis, “the degree of specificity of 
the request[,]” favors international e-discovery for a narrower request.  
274. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The most dispositive factor of the 
Zubulake seven-factor test, “[t]he extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover 
relevant information,” disfavors cost-shifting for more specific requests. 
275. See Erica M. Davila, International E-Discovery: Navigating the Maze, 8 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. 
POL’Y 1, 33 (2008) (“Due to the sheer volume of ESI, the same considerations that courts must 
consider domestically in determining whether a discovery request is reasonable must be considered 
with international ESI, including the accessibility of the data and the cost to collect, review, and 
produce enormous volumes of ESI.”). 
276. See id. 
277. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324. 
278. See supra Part III.B–C. 
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in international e-discovery.279 Courts could remedy this in one of two 
ways. They could design a separate cost-shifting test for international e-
discovery, or they could extend the Zubulake test to international e-
discovery. Adopting a separate test for international e-discovery would 
not be ideal. Two distinct tests would necessarily differ, with one being 
more likely to result in cost-shifting. Producing parties would have an 
incentive to store data, whenever possible, in the location covered by the 
test more likely to result in cost-shifting. 
Applying the Zubulake test to all e-discovery, regardless of the ESI’s 
location, would promote fairness by preventing parties from gaining 
unfair advantages through strategic placement of ESI. At the same time, 
transnational businesses can make business decisions with more 
certainty and uniformity. Under this Comment’s approach, a 
transnational business would know that the Zubulake test applies even 
when the requested ESI is neither entirely international nor entirely 
domestic, such as when the business stores relevant data online or on the 
cloud.280 If there is a separate test for cost-shifting in international e-
discovery, transnational businesses might not know which standard 
would apply until the discovery stage of litigation. 
Another benefit of extending the Zubulake test to all e-discovery is 
that it would promote judicial economy. In Quinby v. WestLB AG,281 the 
plaintiff made an e-discovery request for some data located in the United 
States and some data located in England and Germany.282 The court in 
that case applied the Zubulake test and considered cost-shifting for the 
entire e-discovery request, including the international e-discovery 
portion, in the same motions proceeding.283 Promoting judicial economy 
                                                     
279. See U & I Corp. v. Advanced Med. Design, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 667, 677 (M.D. Fla. 2008) 
(allowing cost-shifting based on the unique facts of the case); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 
94, 101–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying Zubulake cost-shifting test to an e-discovery request that 
involved both domestic and foreign ESI without explaining why Zubulake is appropriate for 
international e-discovery); In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482, 496 (E.D. 
Pa. 2005) (shifting costs under FRCP 45 without articulating criteria for future cost-shifting 
determinations). 
280. See Doug Austin, eDiscovery Trends: The Challenges of International eDiscovery, 
EDISCOVERY DAILY BLOG (June 23, 2011), http://www.ediscoverydaily.com/2011/06/ediscovery-
trends-the-challenges-of-international-ediscovery.html (“Thanks to the widespread use of cloud 
computing and other types of online storage, the physical location of ESI sought in eDiscovery is 
not always easy to pinpoint. Information transmitted electronically in an email or text message, can 
pass through any number of phone lines and routers, to many servers and client machines around the 
globe, so determining the location of a message can become virtually impossible.”). 
281. 245 F.R.D. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
282. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Lori Carey at 2–3, Quinby, 245 F.R.D. 94 (No. 04 Civ. 
07406 (WHP) (HBP)). 
283. Quinby, 245 F.R.D. at 101–11. 
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results in cost-savings for the parties and for society as a whole.284 
Because applying the Zubulake test to international e-discovery would 
promote fairness and judicial economy, courts should extend the 
Zubulake test to all e-discovery. 
2.  Courts Should Allow Cost-Shifting for Transmission and 
Transportation Expenses and for the Costs of Court-Ordered 
Translation but Not for Blocking Statute Fines 
As discussed above, the three additional costs of international e-
discovery are transmission and transportation costs, translation costs, 
and foreign blocking statute fines.285 Cost-shifting is generally 
appropriate for transmission and transportation costs and for the costs of 
court-mandated translations. However, cost-shifting is inappropriate for 
discretionary translation expenses and for foreign blocking statute fines. 
a.  Courts Should Allow Cost-Shifting for Transmission and 
Transportation Expenses 
Courts should allow shifting of transmission and transportation costs 
because such costs are part of the production process.286 Production, in 
the discovery context, involves making a requested item available to the 
requesting party for inspection and review.287 For ESI located outside of 
the United States, the producing party must transmit or transport the ESI 
to the United States so that the requesting party can have access to the 
ESI.288 Courts generally allow cost-shifting for production costs.289 
                                                     
284. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 923 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “judicial economy” as 
“[e]fficiency in the operation of the courts and the judicial system; esp., the efficient management of 
litigation so as to minimize duplication of effort and to avoid wasting the judiciary’s time and 
resources”). Black’s Law Dictionary gives the example of consolidating two cases in a trial, which 
is analogous to the situation here of consolidating cost-shifting determinations for two or more sets 
of ESI in a single proceeding. Id. 
285. See supra Part III.B. 
286. See Scott Fischer et al., Gathering, Reviewing, and Producing ESI: An Eight-Stage Process, 
in MANAGING E-DISCOVERY AND ESI, supra note 182, at 340 (describing how producing parties 
generate a “production set” for the requesting party). For more information on the process of 
transmission, see David Garrett, Conducting E-Discovery in Europe: Practice Pointers for 
Corporate Counsel, STROZ FRIEDBERG (2009), 
http://www.strozfriedberg.com/files/Publication/e6a85ed0-7d28-4457-a755-
06e842ba2058/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/27e1777c-67e2-41ea-93f0-
0d03020883be/DGarrett_Intl%20Ediscovery%20Article%20v2.pdf. 
287. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1328 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “produce” as “[t]o provide . . . in 
response to subpoena or discovery request”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1) (describing 
production generally). 
288. See United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 272 F.R.D. 235, 240 (D.D.C. 2011) 
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Therefore, because transmission and transportation are production costs, 
courts should consider shifting such costs to the requesting party if they 
pose an undue burden or expense to the producing party.290 
b.  Courts Should Consider Shifting Translation Costs for Court-
Ordered Translations but Not for Discretionary Translations 
Courts should only consider shifting translation costs when the court 
orders translation. Translation costs are similar to review costs in that 
parties incur them after the data has been produced.291 Courts do not 
generally shift review costs because the parties determine for themselves 
how they want to review data.292 In the case of translation, there are two 
primary reasons not to shift costs. First, holding each party responsible 
for its own translation costs allows each party to control the accuracy of 
its own translations and to perform more thorough translations of key 
documents.293 Second, shifting the costs of translation would be 
inappropriate under the “total cost” approach to accessibility, because 
the requesting party generally cannot cause the producing party to incur 
undue translation costs.294 Absent a court order requiring translation, the 
producing party does not need to translate any documents at all.295 
                                                     
(“Since the defendants employ persons overseas, this data collection may have to be shipped to the 
United States, or sent by network connections with finite capacity . . . .”). 
289. See, e.g., Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
290. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
291. See In re P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 687 F.2d 501, 504–09 (1st Cir. 1982); see also DATICON 
ELEC. EVIDENCE DISCOVERY, INC., supra note 24, at 2 (describing translation cost as “cost . . . of 
multi-lingual review”). 
292. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 577 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Zubulake III, 
216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe Entm’t, Inc., 205 F.R.D. at 432. 
293. For example, parties may choose to translate through human or machine translators. Some 
machine translators, such as Google Translate, are free, but they are less accurate and thorough than 
human translators. For more information on how parties translate ESI, see Chris Wilen, Foreign 
Language e-Discovery – An Introduction, DISCOVERY RESOURCES (June 16, 2011), 
http://www.discoveryresources.org/technology-counsel/foreign-language-e-discovery-
%E2%80%93-an-introduction/. 
294. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see infra Part IV.B.3 (advocating “total cost” accessibility 
approach to Zubulake). 
295. See In re P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 687 F.2d at 506 (stating that there is no authority for courts 
to order translation); see also Nature’s Plus Nordic A/S v. Natural Organics, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 437, 
439, 441 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that while courts do not have authority to order a producing party 
to provide translations, a producing party should produce any documents that have already been 
translated into English); In re Fialuridine (FIAU) Prods. Liab. Litig., 163 F.R.D. 386, 387 n.2 
(D.D.C. 1995) (citing two cases where courts have denied a plaintiff’s motion to compel defendant 
to produce English translations of documents in a foreign language). But see Stapleton v. Kawasaki 
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Therefore, in situations where the court does not order the producing 
party to translate documents in a foreign language to English for the 
benefit of the requesting party, there is no need to consider cost-
shifting.296 Leaving each party in control of translation costs allows each 
party to control its own costs of litigation. 
c.  Courts Should Not Shift Blocking Statute Fines 
Cost-shifting is not appropriate for blocking statute fines.297 The 
purpose of cost-shifting is to address undue burdens or expenses 
incurred by the producing party in producing documents for the 
requesting party.298 By choosing to store ESI in a foreign country, a 
party willingly subjects itself to applicable foreign laws, including 
foreign blocking statutes. As a result, foreign blocking statute fines are 
not undue burdens. In addition, cost-shifting would require the 
requesting party, who has not violated a blocking statute, to pay some or 
all of a fine imposed on the producing party.299 Thus, cost-shifting could 
incentivize producing parties to be less careful in addressing blocking 
statutes, resulting in more blocking statute violations and harming 
foreign relations. 
Where courts are concerned that blocking statute fines may be overly 
burdensome, they may adopt remedial measures other than cost-shifting. 
Employing the preliminary comity analysis,300 courts should consider 
                                                     
Heavy Indus., Ltd., 69 F.R.D. 489, 490 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (admonishing the producing party for 
failure to translate documents from Japanese to English and requiring the producing party to 
reimburse the requesting party’s translation costs). 
296. The parties have discretion to translate. The general rule is that parties pay for their own 
costs of litigation. See In re P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 687 F.2d at 506. In re Puerto Rico Electric 
Power Authority stated in a footnote that when one party has no resources to translate a key 
document, a court might issue a translation order. Id. at 509 n.2. However, the court stated that the 
producing party could receive reimbursement. Id. In situations where there is a translation order, 
such as the hypothetical one from In re Puerto Rico Electric Power Authortiy, the court should 
apply the cost-shifting test advocated in this approach, namely a comity analysis followed by the 
two-step Zubulake test. 
297. See Pierre Grosdidier, The French Blocking Statute, the Hague Evidence Convention, and 
the Case Law: Lessons for French Parties Responding to American Discovery, HAYNES & BOONE, 
LLP 31–32 (Aug 22 2011), 
http://www.haynesboone.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Attorney%20Publications/French_Blockin
g_Statute_08-24-11.pdf (discussing blocking statute fines). 
298. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
299. Although producing parties might face situations where they have to produce ESI and incur 
a blocking statute fine or not produce ESI and incur a sanction from an American court, the decision 
is one for the producing party. The requesting party generally has no control over where the 
producing party stores information, so it would be unfair to shift costs. 
300. See supra Part III.A. 
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whether a certain international e-discovery request is likely to result in 
foreign blocking statute fines301 and then weigh the request’s costs and 
benefits accordingly.302 In addition, American diplomats can negotiate 
with foreign diplomats for more favorable international e-discovery 
laws.303 
3.  Courts Should Modify the Zubulake Test to Consider Total 
Relevant Costs Rather Than Focusing on Costs Associated with 
ESI Format 
To determine whether an e-discovery request poses an undue burden 
or expense, the Zubulake court focused primarily on the costs associated 
with the requested ESI’s format.304 However, courts should also consider 
other relevant costs in the accessibility step of the Zubulake test.305 
Doing so would comport with the language of FRCP 26, render the test 
adaptable to changing technological standards, and promote fairness. 
In 2006, FRCP 26 was amended to address the costs of e-discovery.306 
The 2006 Amendment to FRCP 26 frames “accessibility” in terms of 
“substantial burden and cost.”307 This amendment validates the federal 
district courts’ common post-Zubulake approach, which treats 
                                                     
301. American courts and foreign courts have procedural and jurisprudential differences that add 
uncertainty to an American court’s evaluation of whether a particular international e-discovery 
request is likely to result in blocking statute fines. Nonetheless, American courts should generally 
consider the text of the blocking statute, the foreign interests the blocking statute seeks to protect, 
and any related statutes or cases that give additional meaning to the blocking statute when 
determining whether a request is likely to result in foreign blocking statute fines. 
302. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987) (articulating the five-factor comity analysis that balances American 
interests with foreign interests and weighs the request’s pros and cons). 
303. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“It is the Executive that normally decides when a course of action is 
important enough to risk affronting a foreign nation or placing a strain on foreign commerce. It is 
the Executive, as well, that is best equipped to determine how to accommodate foreign interests 
along with our own.”).  
304. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The court noted that the producing 
party must incur additional costs to restore ESI on backup tapes. Id. at 320. The court did not 
mention what factors, other than storage format, are relevant for determining accessibility.  
305. For example, the relevant costs of the production stage could include, among other costs, the 
costs of restoring ESI and searching for responsive data. See supra Part I.B. Relevant costs in the 
context of international e-discovery could also include transmission and transportation costs and 
certain translation costs. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
306. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
307. Id. (“[S]ome sources of electronically stored information can be accessed only with 
substantial burden and cost. In a particular case, these burdens and costs may make the information 
on such sources not reasonably accessible.”). 
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accessibility as a matter of total cost, not just costs associated with ESI 
data format.308 
Analyzing accessibility in terms of total relevant costs allows courts 
to continue applying the Zubulake test even if the prevailing 
technological standards change. The five categories of data storage 
formats recognized in the Zubulake test do not capture all the ESI in the 
digital universe. One early e-discovery case that illustrated this was 
OpenTV v. Liberate Technologies,309 a case that involved the e-discovery 
of software source code,310 which is not in one of the five categories of 
storage formats discussed in Zubulake.311 In recent years, some 
companies have started storing their ESI in the “cloud,”312 and future 
technological innovations will usher in new modes of electronic data 
storage. Because cost-shifting is only suitable for inaccessible data, 
defining accessibility in terms of total relevant cost allows for cost-
shifting for ESI in a wide variety of digital formats, including formats 
yet to be invented. 
Furthermore, the “total cost” accessibility approach promotes fairness 
better than Zubulake’s “format” accessibility approach. In a recent case, 
the plaintiffs requested that the defendants produce ESI in archived e-
mail accounts and shared network drives at a cost of $1,900,000.313 
Under a strict application of the “storage format” accessibility approach, 
cost-shifting would not be available because the data was stored in 
“accessible” formats.314 However, under the “total cost” accessibility 
approach, the court would probably find that the exorbitant $1,900,000 
cost of e-discovery creates an undue burden or expense for the 
                                                     
308. See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 634 (D. Kan. 2006) (stating that the 
producing party has the burden of showing that the requested ESI is not accessible based on “undue 
burden or cost”); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 476–77 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (noting that 
“[a]ccessibility turns largely on the expense of production”); Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit 
Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding data in an 
accessible storage format to be “inaccessible” due to the high costs of reconstructing the data). 
309. 219 F.R.D. 474 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
310. See id. at 477 (“While the source code at issue in this case is not ‘backed up’ in the manner 
of the e-mails at issue in the Zubulake cases, it is similarly expensive and time consuming to make it 
available in a usable form for discovery.”). 
311. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
312. See James Berriman & Jack Notarangelo, eDiscovery in the Cloud: A Nightmare Scenario, 
CLOUDBOOK (2010), http://www.cloudbook.net/resources/stories/ediscovery-in-the-cloud-a-
nightmare-scenario. 
313. Thermal Design, Inc. v. Guardian Bldg. Prods., Inc., 08-C-828, 2011 WL 1527025, at *1 
(E.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 2011). 
314. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318–20. Indeed, the court in Zubulake I refused to shift the 
costs of conducting e-discovery on “archived e-mails on optical disks.” 
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producing party, meaning that the ESI is inaccessible and that cost-
shifting is available.315 The “total cost” accessibility approach is 
therefore fairer in that it allows courts to consider cost-shifting for all 
burdensome e-discovery requests, regardless of the ESI’s storage 
format.316 
C.  Courts Should Adopt an Escrow System for Enforcing Cost-
Shifting Orders 
Once a court orders cost-shifting, it should ensure that the requesting 
party actually reimburses the producing party for the shifted portion of 
the costs. Without a way to enforce cost-shifting, plaintiffs can file 
lawsuits intended to harass a defendant, request large volumes of ESI, 
cause the defendant to conduct e-discovery, and then fail to pay for 
shifted costs afterwards. The court could dismiss the lawsuit, but the 
defendant would have already incurred the e-discovery costs and would 
not be able to recoup them. Currently, the FRCP do not set forth a 
mechanism to enforce cost-shifting. To enforce cost-shifting, the courts 
should develop an escrow system with three steps: deposit, production, 
and reconciliation. This escrow system should apply to both domestic 
and international e-discovery. 
First, the deposit step would require the requesting party to deposit a 
percentage of the shifted e-discovery costs with the court upon the 
granting of the e-discovery request.317 Second, the court would notify the 
producing party of receipt of the deposit and order the producing party to 
commence e-discovery. Third, and lastly, once the producing party has 
turned over the requested ESI to the requesting party, the court would 
release the deposited funds to the producing party and require the 
requesting party to reconcile the balance and pay the producing party the 
remaining sum of the shifted costs. This escrow approach would allow 
the producing party to at least recover some of the e-discovery costs 
                                                     
315. See Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 
465–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding data that would cost around $400,000 to produce to be 
“inaccessible” under the “total cost” accessibility approach). 
316. In the Thermal Design, Inc. case, the court denied the expensive e-discovery request 
altogether. Thermal Design, Inc., 2011 WL 1527025, at * 1, *3. A court applying the “total cost” 
accessibility variation of the Zubulake test could reach the same conclusion. See Wood v. Capital 
One Servs., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-1445 (NPM/DEP), 2011 WL 2154279, at *3, *8, *13 (N.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 15, 2011) (denying an e-discovery request that would cost the producing party $5,000,000 to 
process, review, and produce the ESI). 
317. In a slightly different context, a federal district court used a similar approach that required a 
party to deposit some money with the court registry for future disbursement to an e-discovery 
vendor. See Peskoff IV, 251 F.R.D. 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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even if the requesting party is later unwilling or unable to pay for the 
remaining shifted costs in the reconciliation stage. 
V.  APPLYING THE PROPOSED COST-SHIFTING APPROACH 
TO THE FACTS OF IN RE AUTOMOTIVE REFINISHING PAINT 
ANTITRUST LITIGATION DEMONSTRATES THE 
APPROACH’S ABILITY TO RESOLVE INTERNATIONAL 
E-DISCOVERY DISPUTES 
As described previously, the plaintiffs in In re Automotive Refinishing 
Paint Antitrust Litigation made an e-discovery request against a non-
party trade association in Belgium named CEPE.318 CEPE objected on 
grounds of undue burden and cost.319 Although CEPE was a non-party, 
at least one federal district court has concluded that the Zubulake test 
was applicable to non-parties as well.320 This section will assume that 
CEPE’s assertions regarding the burden of the discovery request were 
factually accurate.321 
In the actual case, the court ordered the requesting party, the 
plaintiffs, to compensate CEPE for production costs under FRCP 45 
because CEPE was a non-party.322 The court stated the general 
proposition from the FRCP 45 advisory committee’s note is that courts 
should protect non-parties from significant discovery expenses.323 Non-
parties are not involved in litigation and therefore “should not be forced 
to subsidize an unreasonable share of the costs of a litigation.”324 
Although the court in In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust 
Litigation applied FRCP 45, the court did not set forth criteria for when 
cost-shifting is appropriate for international e-discovery requests. Also, 
the court did not explain what constitutes “significant expenses” or “an 
unreasonable share of the costs.”325 The proposed approach, involving a 
preliminary comity analysis, the “total cost” accessibility approach, and 
application of the seven Zubulake cost-shifting factors, sets forth criteria 
                                                     
318. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
319. Id. 
320. See Couch v. Wan, CV F 08-1621 LJO DLB, 2011 WL 2971118 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2011). 
321. See Opposition of CEPE, supra note 237, at 2, 13. CEPE asserted that they were a small 
non-profit organization headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, and that any relevant ESI they might 
have would be in Brussels. 
322. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 496; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
45(c). 
323. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 496. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. (citation omitted). 
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that would not only protect CEPE from significant discovery expenses 
but would also address the unique costs and sovereignty concerns of 
international e-discovery. 
A. The E-Discovery Request Presented in In re Automotive 
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation Passes the Comity Analysis 
The preliminary step under the proposed approach, before a court 
continues to the Zubulake test, is the five-factor comity analysis.326 The 
court in In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation found 
that “the requested information is relevant and directly pertains to [the 
Plaintiffs’] antitrust claims against Defendants,” 327 so the first factor,328 
“the importance to the . . . litigation of the documents or other 
information requested[,]” probably favors discovery. Nonetheless, the 
court found that the international e-discovery request was too broad,329 
so the second factor, “the degree of specificity of the request,”330 
disfavors discovery. The information did not originate in the United 
States, and there was no indication that the information was obtainable 
through means other than international e-discovery.331 Therefore, the 
third and fourth factors, “whether the information originated in the 
United States” and “the availability of alternative means of securing the 
information,”332 respectively, favor discovery. Because CEPE did not 
raise an objection based on Belgium’s sovereign interests, the fifth factor 
appears to favor discovery.333 On the whole, then, the requested ESI 
would be discoverable under the proposed comity analysis. 
B.  The Requested Data Would Be Inaccessible Under the “Total 
Cost” Accessibility Step of the Zubulake Test 
The first step of the Zubulake test looks at whether the requested ESI 
is accessible.334 This Comment advocates a “total cost” accessibility 
                                                     
326. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c) 
(1987). 
327. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 496. 
328. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28. 
329. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 496. 
330. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28. 
331. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 484. 
332. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28. 
333. See id. 
334. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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standard that takes into account all relevant costs of the particular stage 
of e-discovery.335 The e-discovery request asks for the production of 
ESI, so the court should consider all relevant production costs. Based on 
the facts provided by CEPE, the e-discovery request “demand[ed] 
documents from 1990 through [2005]” and covered “electronic files and 
e-mail (including archived backup files).”336 The broad scope of the e-
discovery request, which covered fifteen years, would likely generate a 
high volume of potential results and cause CEPE to incur high e-
discovery expenses.337 Therefore, producing the requested ESI would 
likely pose an undue burden to CEPE, and the court would therefore 
consider the ESI inaccessible. 
C.  The Seven-Factor Test Favors Shifting Most or All of the Costs in 
In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation 
The second step of the Zubulake test determines whether there should 
be cost-shifting when inaccessible data is sought.338 Applying this step 
of the test, the court would first look at the two marginal utility 
factors.339 The first factor of the Zubulake test takes into account the 
specificity of the request.340 As the request in In re Automotive 
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation covers fifteen years,341 the court 
would probably not find it insufficiently specific and would favor cost-
shifting.342 The second factor of the Zubulake test considers “[t]he 
availability of [the] information from other sources.”343 CEPE noted that 
“plaintiffs have had ample alternative opportunities to take discovery 
concerning any matters that may affect the U.S. market.”344 Court filings 
for this case confirm that the court had already granted a discovery 
request that the plaintiffs had filed against the defendants.345 Thus, the 
                                                     
335. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
336. See Opposition of CEPE, supra note 237, at 12. 
337. See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2005); 
Opposition of CEPE, supra note 237, at 12–13. 
338. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324. 
339. Id. at 323. 
340. Id. at 322. 
341. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 496. 
342. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323. 
343. Id. at 322. 
344. See Opposition of CEPE, supra note 237, at 13. 
345. See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482; Memorandum & Order, In 
re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (No. 10-MD-1426). 
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second factor favors cost-shifting.346 As both factors in the marginal 
utility test favor cost-shifting, the court would likely shift costs. 
Next, the court would assess the less important cost factors.347 The 
third factor in the Zubulake test is “[t]he total cost of production, 
compared to the amount in controversy.”348 This case involved multiple 
defendants and was an antitrust action that could result in an award of 
treble damages, so the amount in controversy was likely high.349 
However, it is likely that the total cost of production for CEPE was also 
high, though perhaps not as high as the amount in controversy. The third 
factor, therefore, is either neutral or slightly disfavors cost-shifting. The 
fourth factor in the Zubulake test is “[t]he total cost of production, 
compared to the resources available to each party.”350 In some instances, 
this factor might discourage courts from shifting costs against plaintiffs 
with fewer resources.351 The facts of the case did not mention the 
resources available to the plaintiffs, but CEPE was a small non-profit 
trade association with eight employees.352 As such, this factor probably 
favors cost-shifting under the fourth factor. The fifth factor in the 
Zubulake test is “[t]he relative ability of each party to control costs and 
its incentive to do so.”353 This factor favors cost-shifting because the 
plaintiffs could have controlled costs by requesting ESI from a shorter 
span of years but decided not to do so.354 Two of the three “cost factors” 
thus favor cost-shifting. 
Last, the court would consider the least important “other factors.”355 
Factor six of the Zubulake test is “[t]he importance of the issues at stake 
in the litigation.”356 The antitrust suit is relatively important as it 
involves an alleged international price-fixing scheme that could affect 
the U.S. market for automotive paint and hurt consumers.357 However, 
                                                     
346. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (“If the 
information is available from another source, the marginal utility from the e-discovery is low, and 
would support cost-shifting.”). 
347. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323. 
348. Id. at 322. 
349. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006). 
350. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322. 
351. See Xpedior Credit Trust v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
352. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 482, 496 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
353. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322. 
354. See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 496. 
355. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323. 
356. Id. at 322. 
357. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 484. 
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antitrust suits are likely not “novel.”358 Other courts have found that this 
factor is neutral in gender discrimination and securities manipulation 
cases, as such cases are insufficiently “novel.”359 Hence, this factor is 
likely neutral. Factor seven is “[t]he relative benefits to the parties of 
obtaining the information.”360 The e-discovery request would benefit the 
requesting party by providing them with a lot of information from a 
period of fifteen years that might possibly help them with their 
lawsuit.361 However, the e-discovery request would not benefit CEPE, 
and CEPE vehemently objected to the request.362 Due to the 
disproportionate benefit to the requesting party, this factor would favor 
cost-shifting. 
In sum, five of the seven Zubulake factors would favor cost-shifting. 
Because CEPE is located in Belgium,363 the shifted costs would have 
likely included transportation or transmission costs. After determining 
the percentage of costs to shift to the plaintiff, the court should require 
the plaintiffs to deposit a certain portion of the shifted costs with the 
court under the escrow system proposed above.364 Once CEPE produced 
the requested ESI to the court’s satisfaction, the court would release the 
deposited funds to CEPE and require the plaintiffs to pay the remaining 
sum of shifted costs. 
The proposed approach is preferable to the court’s analysis in In re 
Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation. First, the inclusion of 
the comity analysis addresses the foreign relations and sovereignty 
concerns of international e-discovery. Second, applying the Zubulake 
test would allow the court to determine whether to shift costs in a 
consistent manner, rather than using different criteria from case to case. 
Third, the escrow system would ensure that the one producing ESI 
actually receives reimbursement for shifted costs. 
                                                     
358. There is a body of antitrust law, which includes some cases that involved alleged foreign 
antitrust conspirators similar to In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation. See, e.g., F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (case involving conspiracy among 
vitamin companies, including some foreign companies). 
359. Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (involving securities manipulation); Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (involving gender discrimination). 
360. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322. 
361. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 496. 
362. Id. at 485. 
363. Id. at 484. 
364. See supra Part IV.C. 
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CONCLUSION 
Courts should address international comity concerns raised by 
international e-discovery requests through a preliminary comity analysis, 
address the costs of international e-discovery through the Zubulake test 
for cost-shifting, and enforce cost-shifting orders through an escrow 
system. Although existing law lacks an integrated framework that 
addresses both the international comity and cost concerns associated 
with international e-discovery, this Comment’s approach addresses both. 
The preliminary comity analysis would allow courts to weigh the 
sovereign interests of the United States and the foreign country that 
houses the data and would prevent needless negative impact on 
international relations. Cost-shifting under Zubulake would protect 
producing parties from unduly burdensome international e-discovery 
requests, promote consistent results for situations involving domestic 
ESI and foreign ESI, and further judicial economy by allowing courts to 
determine cost-shifting for ESI in a variety of locations in the same 
motions proceeding. Moreover, defining the accessibility step of 
Zubulake in terms of total costs would allow the courts more flexibility 
in situations involving new technological developments and unique 
circumstances. Finally, the escrow system for all e-discovery realizes the 
benefits of the Zubulake test by requiring the requesting party to post 
some of the shifted e-discovery costs prior to the production of ESI and 
ensuring that the producing party actually receives at least some of the 
shifted costs. By adopting this approach to e-discovery, courts can better 
address the comity concerns and costs of international e-discovery 
consistently. 
 
 
 
 
